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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
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LLOYD E. LISH, J R . , 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
- v s -
DEAN COMPTON, 
Defendant /Appellant. 
0 0 0 O 0 0 0 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 14111 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the Plaintiff /Respondent, Lloyd E. Lish, 
J r . , against the Defendant/Appellant, Dean Compton, for damages which 
he sustained as the result of a contract for the sale of wheat which was 
breached by Defendant. 
The part ies will be referred to herein as they appear in the 
lower court. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The t r ia l of the case was held in the District Court of Box 
Elder County on the 13th and 14th days of February, 1975 before the 
Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen with a jury. The case was submitted to the 
jury on Special Verdict and on February 14, 1975 they returned the Verdict 
answering the Interrogatories in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant. 
The Defendant made an oral Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding f 
•li-
the Verdict which was denied and Judgment was entered in favor of the Plaintiff 
ip 
on April 28, 1975. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL * 
m 
The Plaintiff seeks to have the Judgment of the District Court 
affirmed. * 
STATEMENT OF FACTS m 
• -aa 
This action ar i ses out of a contract which Plaintiff, Lloyd E. Lish, 
J r . , claims he entered into with the Defendant, Dean Compton, on August 2, 1973 i 
whereby Defendant agreed to sell and Plaintiff agreed to buy 15, 000 bushels of red 
i 
wheat "as i s " at $3. 30 per bushel. Defendant denied that the contract was entered^ 
into and, additionally, asser ted the Statute of Frauds as a defense. (R. 204, m 
• • • 
Jury Instruction #4) 
Both parties testified that a telephone conversation occurred
 § 
I 
between them on August 2, 1973 wherein they discussed the sale of 15,000 bushels 
i 
of wheat from Defendant to Plaintiff. It was the Defendants contention that only 
one conversation occurred between the part ies on this date and that even though
 f 
the sale of the wheat was discussed, no contract was entered into. (R. 132, 133, 
i 
142) Conversely, the Plaintiff testified that two telephone conversations occurred
 | 
between the part ies on this date and in the first conversation the price of wheat
 fl 
was discussed and Defendant made mention of the fact that some of his neighbors 
had received $3.25 per bushel for comparable wheat at this t ime. Plaintiff
 t 
further testified that in the second conversation an oral contract was entered into * 
for the sale of 15, 000 bushels of red wheat "as i s " at $3.30 per bushel. (R. 15-18) 
In reviewing the telephone log of the Defendant, it confirmed the fact that 
two calls were made between Defendant and Plaintiff on the date in question. 
(R. 144, Exhibit #13) 
On or about August 3, 1973 the Plaintiff prepared a written 
confirmation of the contract which contained the following: "red wheat, 
rye mix. . .15,00 bushels, $3. 30 per bushel, as i s . " (R. 19, Exhibit #2) 
This confirmation was mailed by the Plaintiff to the Defendant on or about 
August 14, 1973 and was received by the Defendant in the mails in the after-
noon of August 15, 1973. (R. 27, Exhibit #3) 
Following the conversation between Plaintiff and Defendant on 
August 2, 1973, the Plaintiff contacted Pillsbury Mills Company in Ogden, 
Utah on the same date and entered into an oral contract with them for the 
sale of 15, 000 bushels of red wheat "as i s " at $3.45 per bushel. This contract 
was evidenced by a written confirmation which was prepared by Pillsbury 
Mills Company on or about August 2, 1973 and was received by the Plaintiff 
some days thereafter. (R. 19, Exhibit #1) 
From the 2nd through the 14th days of August, 1973 the price of 
#1 red wheat on the Ogden grain market increased from $3. 63 per bushel to 
$4. 37 per bushel. (R. 35-40, Exhibit #4) Both the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant, as well as Mr. Rudolph Globoker, an employee of Pillsbury 
Mills Company, Ogden, Utah, testified that such a sharp fluctuation in this 
short a period of time was highly unusual and nothing comparable to this 
had previously occurred. (R. 41, 91, 150) 
The Defendant, Dean Compton, was aware of the sharp increase 
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of the price of wheat during this period and on August 15, 1973 he telephoned 
the Plaintiff, Lloyd E. Lish, J r . , for the ostensible purpose of requesting that 
Plaintiff haul his wheat from his farm in Idaho to Ogden, Utah. As soon as this 
request was made, the Plaintiff interjected and told the Defendant that, "You 
have no wheat, ! ! and that he had resold it to the Pillsbury Mills Company and 
inquired whether or not the Defendant had received the written confirmation* 
The Defendant replied that he had not received the confirmation at that t ime. 
(R. 29-30, 133-134) During this or a second conversation on the same date, 
Mr. Lish testified that Mr. Compton told him he could "get out" of his contract 
with the Pillsbury Mills Company and Mr. Lish responded that he did not think 
he could, however, if Pillsbury Mills Company would be willing to release him 
from his contract, which he intended to perform, he would be glad to re lease 
Mr. Compton. (R. 30) He made the request that Mr. Compton contact the 
representatives of Pillsbury on that day and Mr. Compton met and discussed the 
matter with them in Ogden, Utah. The Defendant was advised by the represen-
tatives of Pillsbury that Mr. Lish did in fact have a contract with them and that 
they intended to enforce the same. (R. 146-147) Mr. Rudolph Globoker, who 
was present during the conversation, testified that Mr. Compton said he did 
not sign a contract with Mr. Lish and that he "couldnft sustain a $19, 000 l o s s . " 
(R. 89-90) 
Mr. Compton concedes that after he returned to his home on 
August 15, 1973 he received the written confirmation from Mr. Lish and that he 
did not send a written rejection of the same to Plaintiff. (R. 103) 
Both Plaintiff and Defendant testified that in the spring and early 
summer of 1973 they had entered into a verbal contract or contracts 
whereby Mr. Compton agreed to sell and Mr. Lish agreed to buy certain 
wheat and barley. (R. 43-45, 140-141) Mr. Compton acknowledges that the 
contracts were verbal and that no written confirmations were received by 
him. Additionally, a time lapse in excess of one month occurred from the time 
the contract was entered into until the grain was hauled and payment 
received by the Defendant and no writing existed until the completion of the 
transaction to evidence the same. (R. 151) Another transaction between 
the part ies occurred on or about July 27, 1973 wherein Mr. Compton contacted 
Mr. Lish by telephone and requested that he take a truck to Mr. Compton1 s 
farm in Little Mountain, Box Elder County, Utah, so he could deposit his 
wheat in the same for storage. Both parties testified that a sale was intended 
to be made in the future but that no contract was entered into concerning the 
price for the wheat at this t ime. After the truck was filled it was taken to 
the grain mill in Ogden, Utah for storage. (R. 141) On or about September 3, 
1973 and following Mr. Compton's failure to deliver the. 15, 000 bushels of 
red wheat at $3, 30 per bushel to Mr. Lish, the parties entered into an oral 
contract for the sale of the wheat. Mr. Compton concedes that he sold the 
wheat to Mr. Lish at this time at $3. 30 per bushel, notwithstanding the fact 
that the price of wheat at that point in time had increased by approximately 
$1. 00 per bushel. (R. 153-154) It was the Plaintiffs testimony that the 
Defendant told him to apply the 1, 000 bushels of wheat to the 15, 000 bushel 
contract and the settlement statement which he proposed at the completion 
of the transaction verifies this . (R. 59-60, Exhibit #7) 
- 5 -
The Defendant is the owner of farms in Cassia County, Idaho 
and Box Elder County, Utah. His occupation for the past 20 to 25 years has 
been in raising and selling farm commodities, principally wheat. He concedes 
that the commodities which he ra i ses are produced primari ly for resa le and that 
he has been engaged in the selling of grain for the 20 to 25 year period. He sells m 
m grain both to grain merchandisers such as Mr. Lish and also directly to grain 
m 
storage facilities or marketers which a re located in Ogden, Utah. He also keeps
 m 
himself apprised of the fluctuation of the price of grains and personally handles m 
m 
all of his business transactions. Additionally, the Defendant admits he has 
1 
"merchandised" grain by entering into a "future contract" for grain not yet
 m 
produced. (R. 100-103) m 
m 
The evidence disclosed that the Defendant, Dean Compton, failed 
ii 
to perform his contract with the Plaintiff, other than for delivery of the 1, 000
 m 
bushels as set forth above. It also indicates that the Plaintiff performed his • 
i 
contract with Pillsbury Mills Company which resulted in substantial losses to 
I 
him because of the increased price of wheat at the time of the breach. (R. 59, « 
81) * 
i 
The jury was instructed as to the contentions of each of the part ies 
i 
and as to the applicable law and the case was submitted to them on Special Verdict J 
(R. 204-211) A unanimous Special Verdict was returned by the jury which * 
i 
provided as follows: 
"We the jury find from a preponderance of the « 
evidence in this case the following answers to 
the questions propounded to us: * 
i 
" 1 . Has the defendant admitted in his testimony 
or otherwise in court that an oral contract for 
i 
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the sale of the wheat was entered into with 
plaintiff? 
Yes X No 
, f2. Was an oral contract entered into between 
plaintiff and defendant for the purchase and 
sale of wheat? 
Yes X No 
" 3 . Was the defendant, on August 2, 1973, a 
merchant as defined by the court 's instructions? 
Yes X No 
M4. Was a written confirmation received by the 
defendant from the plaintiff within a reasonable 
t ime? 
Yes X No. 
M5. What was the market price of as is wheat 
as of August 15, 1973? 
$4.25 per bushel. " (R. 212) 
POINT I 
THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE LOWER COURT ARE PRESUMED BY THE 
REVIEWING COURT ON APPEAL TO BE CORRECT. 
There are numerous cases from the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah, as well as other jurisdictions, supporting the general propo-
sition of the law stated in Point I and no cases have been found by Plaintiff 
stating a contrary position. 
There is not only a presumption of validity on appeal of the 
proceedings in the lower court, but the burden is on the Defendant affirma-
tively to demonstrate e r ro r , and in the absence of such, the judgment must 
- 7 -
be affirmed by the reviewing court. Leithead v. Adair, 10 Utah 2d 282, 351 P . 2d 
956; Coombs v. Pe r ry , 2 Utah 2d 381, 275 P . 2d 680. Not only a re the p r e -
judgment proceedings in the t r ia l court presumed to be correct , but every 
reasonable contendment must be indulged in by the appellate court in favor of it. m 
Burton v. Z . C . M . I . , 122 Utah 360, 349 P. 2d 516; Nagle v. Club Fontainbleu, m 
m 
17 Utah 2d 125, 405 P . 2d 346; Petty v. Gindy Mfg. Corp. , 17 Utah 2d 32, 404 P. 2d 
30. m 
The proposition of law set forth in Point I is binding upon the m 
m 
appellate court whether the case was tried before a judge only or to a judge 
sitting with a jury. However, the presumption in favor of validity has more weigh! 
when the t r i a l court has given i ts approval to the determination of the jury as set 
forth in i ts verdict by refusing to grant a new t r ia l or a judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict to the losing party. See Gordon v. Provo City, 15 Utah 2d 287, 391 a 
P. 2d 430. 
POINT II " . 
THE JURY FOUND THAT THE DEFENDANT ADMITTED IN HIS TESTIMONY g 
OR OTHERWISE IN COURT THAT AN ORAL CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF 
THE WHEAT WAS ENTERED INTO WITH THE PLAINTIFF. i 
It is the contention of the Plaintiff that notwithstanding the denial 
by the Defendant in his Answer that a contract was entered into, his testimony 
in Court was sufficient to show that he had admitted the oral contract was entered, 
into with the Plaintiff and the jury so found in answer to Interrogatory #1. The 
legal proposition encompassing the Plaintiff's position concerning this issue 
i s set forth in Section 70A-2-201, Utah Code Annotated, which provides in part , 
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as follows: 
"70A-2-201. Formal requirements -
Statute of Frauds . - (1) Except as otherwise 
provided in this section a contract for the 
sale of goods for the price of $500 or more 
i s not enforceable by way of action or defense 
unless there is some writing sufficient to 
indicate that a contract for sale has been made 
between the parties and signed by the party 
against whom enforcement is sought or by his 
authorized agent or broker. 
"(3) A contract which does not satisfy the 
requirements of subsection (1) but which is 
valid in other respects is enforceable 
11
 (k) if the party against whom enforcement 
is sought admits in his pleading, testimony or 
otherwise in court that a contract for sale was 
m a d e . . . . " [Emphasis added] 
As set forth above, if a party admits in his "pleadings, tes t i -
mony or otherwise in court" the existence of an oral contract, the Statute 
of Frauds will no longer be a defense to the same. In this case, notwith-
standing the Defendant's denial in his Answer that no contract was entered 
into, there was considerable testimony by him that an oral contract was in 
fact entered into. The Defendant testified that he had talked with the 
Plaintiff about the sale of 15, 000 bushels of red wheat on August 2, 1973 at 
$3. 31 per bushel. He further conceded that if he had received a written 
confirmation from the Plaintiff at an ear l ier date after the conversation of 
August 2, 1973, he would have considered the contract binding. His tes t i -
mony in this regard is as follows: 
- 9 -
nQ - Okay. As I understand your testimony, 
Mr. Compton, you would have considered 
that you had a binding contract with Mr. Lish 
if you had received this confirmation in the 
mail on an ear l ie r date; is that correc t? 
"A - Yes, if an ear l ier date or a phone call. 
nQ - And had Mr. Lish sent you this confirmation 
and you received it on an ear l ier date, you 
would have considered the transaction binding; 
i s that cor rec t? 
!IA - In a reasonable length of t ime, yes . 
!IQ - And because you didn!t receive it until the 
15th you did not feel that you had a binding 
contract with Mr. Lish; is that correc t? 
"A - That is right, yes.1 1 (R. 149, 150) 
The untenable position of the Defendant concerning this i s evidenced by the 
following testimony: 
! ,Q - Do you think your position would have been 
different had the price of grain remained the 
same or gone down between August second and 
August 15? 
11A - I'm sure it would. " (R. 150) 
Additionally, the Defendant totally acknowledges the contract by 
his part ial performance of the same in "selling" wheat to Mr. Lish for the 
contract price of $3. 30 per bushel on September 3, 1973 when the market 
price greatly exceeded this . 
It was noted above that the Statute of Frauds does not purport 
to deny the existence of an oral contract if proven, but only provides that 
under some circumstances the same i s unenforceable. In the case of 
Cohn v. F isher , 287 A. 2d 222, 118 N . J . Super 286 (1972) the Supreme Court 
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of the State of New Jersey was presented with a case involving the same 
statute as is in question here . The Court held that if a party admitted in 
his deposition, answers or otherwise the existence of a contract, he could 
not asser t the Statute as a defense and stated as follows: 
" This court is of the opinion that if a party 
admits an oral contract, he should be bound 
to his bargain. The statute of frauds was 
not designed to protect a party who made an 
oral contract, but rather to aid a party who 
did not make a con t r ac t , . . . M [Emphasis 
added] 
Inasmuch as the jury has made a finding that the Defendant 
admitted the existence of an oral contract as contended by the Plaintiff, i . e . 
for the sale of 15, 000 bushels of red wheat "as i s " at $3.30 per bushel, the 
contract is binding on the part ies and there is no requirement that a "written 
confirmation" be received or that the parties be deemed to be "merchants" 
POINT III 
THE PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT ARE DEEMED MERCHANTS WITHIN 
THE MEANING OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE AND A WRITTEN 
CONFIRMATION OF THE ORAL CONTRACT WAS RECEIVED BY 
DEFENDANT FROM PLAINTIFF WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME. 
It is Plaintiff's position that an oral contract existed for the 
sale of the wheat by Defendant to Plaintiff and that the parties are deemed to 
be "merchants" within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code, and 
that a "written confirmation" was received by Defendant from Plaintiff within 
a reasonable time after the oral contract was entered into. 
As was set forth in Point II, Section 70A-2-201 provides for 
- 1 1 -
some exceptions to the use of the Statute of Frauds as a defense and one such 
exception is as follows: 
"(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable 
time a writing in confirmation of the contract m 
and sufficient against the sender is received * 
and the party receiving it has reason to know its 
contents, it satisfies the requirements of sub- m 
section (1) against such party unless written m 
notice of objection to i ts contents i s given within 
ten days after it is r e c e i v e d . . . . M [Emphasis * 
added] m 
in Ogden, Utah. He kept himself apprised of the fluctuating pr ices of grains 
and handled his business transactions personally. Additionally, the Defendant 
states that he has "merchandised11 in the grain business: 
"A - Yes. I 'm hesitating; I want to be sure I 
get the gist of the question. I've sold directly 
to mills and I have had merchandisers or 
dealers haul it for me to those places for storage 
and put in my name, and then I have made the 
deal and the settlement at a la ter date. I have 
also merchandised where I have made a contract 
ahead of t ime, a future contract, before the grain 
is produced or before it i s harvested, and with 
grain merchandisers . ! l (R. 101-102) 
In Instruction #6 the Court instructed the jury as to who would be 
deemed a "merchant11 within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code as 
-12-
i 
m 
As was noted in the Statement of Facts , the Defendant had engaged 
in the business of raising and selling grain for approximately 20 to 25 years at 
i 
his farms located in Cassia County, Idaho and Box Elder County, Utah. The * 
farm commodities raised by him were produced principally for resa le . He * 
i 
also stated that he had dealt with grain merchandisers such as the Plaintiff 
. f 
during this period, as well as directly with grain mills and storage facilities i 
set forth in Section 70A-2-104 which provides as follows: 
,r(l) 'Merchant' means a person who deals in 
goods of the kind or btherwise by his occupa-
tion holds himself out as having knowledge or 
skill peculiar to the practices or goods 
involved in the transaction or to whom 
such knowledge or skill may be attributed 
by his employment of an agent or broker 
or other intermediary who by his occupation 
holds himself out as having such knowledge or 
skill.! ' 
The jury, in answer to Interrogatory #3 found the Defendant on August 2, 
1973 was a "merchant" as defined in the Court 's Instruction. 
In the case of Campbell v. Yokel, 313 N. E.2d 628, 20 Ill.App.3d 
702 (1974) the Illinois Supreme Court was presented with the question of 
whether a person who is engaged in the farming business could be a "merchant" 
within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code. In holding that the 
Defendants were "merchants" the Court stated as follows: 
"The defendants in the instant case have 
admitted in discovery depositions that 
they have grown and sold soybeans and 
other grains for several years . They 
have sold to the plaintiffs and to other 
grain companies in the past. We believe 
that a farmer who regularly sells his crops 
i s a person !who deals in goods of that kind. ' 
"The authors of the comments to the Uniform 
Commercial Code state that the term 'mer -
chant1 applies to a 'professional in business1 
rather than to a 'casual or inexperienced 
sel ler or buyer . ' The defendants admittedly 
were not 'casual or inexperienced' se l l e r s . 
We believe that farmers who regularly market 
their crops a re 'professionals' in that business 
and are 'merchants ' when they are selling 
those crops. 
- 1 3 -
i 
f !
. . . Placing this small burden upon farmers 
in certain instances lessens the possibility 
that the statute of frauds would be used as 
an instrument of fraud. For example, assuming 
that an oral agreement had been reached in the 
instant case, that the farmers had received the
 m 
written confirmation signed by the plaintiffs and 
that the farmers were not 'merchants , ! the 
farmers would be in a position to speculate on a * 
contract to which the grain company was bound. 
. . . Our holding reduces the possibility of this 
type of practice in cases in which the farmer is m 
a person who regularly sells crops of this kind 
involved in the transaction at hand.!f [Emphasis 
added] • 
I 
Also, in the case of Ohio Grain Co. v. Swisshelm., 15 U. C .C. 304 
I 
(Ohio App. 1973) a fact situation existed which is remarkably similar to the fact
 M 
situation in the instant case. The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant had orally « 
i 
agreed to sell him 15, 000 bushels of soybeans at $5. 00 per bushel to be picked 
' 1 
up at Defendant's farm, but refused to perform the contract, notwithstanding the • 
fact that a written confirmation of the same had been received by him and he had • 
i 
failed to reject the same in writing. The Plaintiff sustained damages when the 
I 
market price of soybeans increased approximately $1. 00 per bushel. In holding i 
that the Defendant was a merchant, the Court stated as follows: f 
i 
"He would represent defendant as a simple 
t i l ler of the soil, unaccustomed to the affairs f 
of business and the market-place. Farming • 
i s no longer confined to simple labor. Only 
an agri-businessman may hope to survive. 
This defendant was clearly familiar with farm 
markets and their operation and followed them 
with some care . Fo r example, he was familiar 
with the bean market in Cincinnati, as well as 
that in his local community. In his many years 
of farming, he knew that corn was sold for 
varying pr ices , depending upon i ts moisture, 
quality and condition, and admitted having some 
idea that the same was true of beans. He had 
-14-
sold some beans a number of years 
before. n [Emphasis added] 
On an application for rehearing, the Court affirmed its ruling and stated 
as follows: 
"While it is true that the te rms 'farmer1 
and 'merchant1 are non synonymous, yet 
neither are they mutually exclusive, and 
each may possess some of the qualifications 
of the other. If, as in our present case, a 
farmer is chargeable with the knowledge or 
skill of a merchant, he is required to act 
accordingly. , f 
The only case cited by Defendant in his Brief to the effect that 
a farmer may not be deemed to be a merchant within the meaning of the 
Uniform Commercial Code is Cook Grains, Inc. v. Fal l is , 395 S. W. 2d 555, 
239 Ark. 962 (1965). It should be noted that in the instant case and in the 
two cases set forth above, there was evidence introduced that the farmer 
produced his commodities primarily for resale and had knowledge of their 
value and markets relating to the same. Conversely, in the Cook Grains 
case, there was no evidence introduced that the Defendant had any knowledge 
other than that of farming and the Court stated as follows: 
11
 There is not a scintilla of evidence in 
the record, or proffered as evidence, that 
appellee is a dealer in goods of the kind 
or by his occupation holds himself out as 
having knowledge or a skill peculiar to the 
practices of goods involved in the transaction, 
and no such knowledge or skill can be a t t r i -
buted to him. I ! 
It should also be noted that the decision in the Cook Grains 
case has been criticized by the leading treat ise on the Uniform Commercial 
Code. In Anderson's Uniform Commercial Code, Second Edition, Vol. 2 
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at page 221, the editors, in referring to the case state as follows: 
11
 • . * If the farmer customarily sells the 
type of farm commodities in quest ion. . . 
there is no reason why he should not be 
deemed to be a m e r c h a n t . . . . " 
As was noted by the pr ior authorities, there i s no logical or 
legal reason why a person who has the requisite knowledge concerning sales 
of certain commodities, even though he may also be a farmer and produce 
the conamodities sold by him, may not be deemed to be a "merchant11 within 
the Uniform Commercial Code. In this instance the Defendant clearly was 
knowledgeable about the sale of the commodity in question and had a consi-
derable amount of expertise on the subject matter and should be bound by 
his contracts as was the Plaintiff. 
The second cr i ter ia for the provisions of this exception to the 
Statute of Frauds i s that a "written confirmation" be sent and received by 
the Defendant within a reasonable time after the orial contract was entered 
into on August 2, 1973. The "written confirmation" was received on 
August 15, 1973 and the jury found that this was within a "reasonable t i m e . " 
(R. 105, 212) 
The jury was instructed as to what was meant by a "reasonable 
t ime" within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code and Section 
70A-1-204 provides in part as follows: 
"(2) What i s a reasonable time for taking 
any action depends on the nature, purpose 
and circumstances of such action " 
The Court further inforxned the jury that in determining what i s a reasonable 
t ime, they could take into account the course of dealing between the part ies 
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which is defined in Section 70A-1-205, Utah Code Annotated. (Instruction 
#7, R. 207) 
The only evidence of what constitutes a "reasonable t ime" 
was the testimony of the Plaintiff to the effect that there was no unusual 
or undue delay in sending the written confirmation. (R. 80) 
Additionally, as was set forth in the Statement of Facts , the 
sharp increase in the price of wheat during the elapsed time in question had 
not occurred on any previous occasion and was totally unexpected by the 
par t ies . 
In the instant case the prior dealings between the part ies 
occurred from approximately March or April through July of 1973 wherein 
oral agreements were entered into whereby Defendant agreed to sell and 
Plaintiff agreed to buy certain wheat and barley. These contracts were 
entered into orally and no written confirmations of the same were sent by 
Plaintiff to Defendant. Additionally, a time lapse in excess of one month 
existed from the time the contracts were entered into until the Defendant was 
paid and no written evidence of the contract existed until this t ime. In view 
of the foregoing, it can scarcely be contended by the Defendant that a practice 
had been established whereby he should have received a written confirmation 
of the oral contract prior to the lapse of 13 days which occurred in the instant 
case. 
In the case of Azevedo v. Minister, 471 P . 2d 661 (Nev. 1970) 
the Nevada Court, in a case involving the sale of 1, 500 tons of hay, addressed 
itself to the question of what was a "reasonable t ime" under the same 
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statutes as involved in the instant case, and stated as follows: 
"4. The * Reasonable Time1 Factor . 
"Subsection 2 of NRS 104.2201 provides that 
the confirming memorandum must be sent m 
within a reasonable time after the oral * 
contract is made. Appellant argues that the 
delay of 10 weeks as a matter of law is an m 
unreasonable t ime. We do not agree. What • 
is reasonable must be decided by the t r i e r of 
facts under all the circumstances of the case under 1 
considerat ion*. . . f l [Emphasis added] « 
For other cases holding that what i s a "reasonable t ime" within the meaning of 
- • 
the Uniform Commercial Code is a question for the t r i e r of fact, see Robinson v. 
Jonathan Logan Financial, 277 A. 2d 115 (1971); and Irrigation Motor & Pump g 
Co. v. Belcher, 483 P . 2d 980 (1971). * 
M 
The Defendant, in his Brief, cites some cases to the effect that 
what is a reasonable time may be determined by the Court as a matter of law. * 
• 
However, these cases do not deal with the provisions of the Uniform Commercial 
i 
Code and even if they did, the legal principle therein is only applicable if the 
surrounding circumstances during the time period a re not in dispute as they , 
i 
were in the instant case. In this regard the case, of Hill v. Hobart, 16 Maine 
164 (1836) cited by the Defendant provides as follows:
 t 
" But -where what is a reasonable time 
depends upon certain other controverted < 
points, or where the motives of the party 
into the question, the whole i s necessari ly 
to be submitted to a jury, before any < 
judgment can be formed, whether the time
 { 
was or was not reasonable ." 
i 
The Defendant admits that no written rejection of the written .( 
confirmation was sent by him to the Plaintiff. However, in his Brief he argues 
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that the oral statement to the Plaintiff that he did not intend to perform 
eliminates the necessity of the written rejection. This contention has been 
made by him without any supporting statutory or case law and is clearly 
without mer i t . In this regard, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada 
in the Azevedo case, supra, discussed the purpose for the adoption of the 
particular provision of the Uniform Commercial Code requiring that a 
written rejection be sent and stated as follows: 
"While §2-201(2) of the Code is entirely 
new in the commercial law field, its 
only effect is to eliminate the defense of 
the statute of frauds. The party alleging 
the contract still has the burden of proving 
that an oral contract was entered into before the 
written confirmation. The purpose of the sub-
section of the Code is to rectify an abuse that 
had developed in the law of commerce. The 
custom arose among business people of con-
firming oral contracts by sending a letter of 
confirmation. This let ter was binding as a 
memorandum on the sender, but not on the 
recipient, because he had not signed it . The 
abuse was that the recipient, not being bound, 
could perform or not, according to his whim 
and the market, whereas the sel ler had to 
perform. Obviously, under these circumstances, 
sending any confirming memorandum was a 
dangerous practice. Subsection (2) of Section 
2-201 of the Code cures the abuse by holding a 
recipient bound unless he communicates his 
objection within 10 days. f l 
The foregoing principle was also discussed in the case of 
Tiffany v. W. M.K. Transit, 493 P.2d 1220, 16 Ariz.App. 415 (1972). The 
Court quoted with approval from an article in the Arizona Law Review 
which provided as follows: 
1 1
. . . 'Under subsection (2).. • , when a letter 
of confirmation is employed between merchants, 
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the recipient must give written notice of 
objection within ten days after receipt or he 
is precluded from setting up the Statute of 
F r a u d s . . . . Buyers and sel lers should confirm 
all oral contracts by let ter and should reply 
immediately (accepting or rejecting) upon 
receipt of such memoranda from the other 
par ty . ! M 
The jury has found, based upon substantial evidence, that the 
part ies entered into the contract as claimed by the Plaintiff for the sale of 
wheat and that the Defendant was a "merchant11 within the meaning of the 
Uniform Commercial Code and that a written confirmation was received by 
the Defendant within a "reasonable time1 ' thereafter. Consequently, the 
Statute of Frauds is not a bar to the Plaintiff's claim. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT CORRECTLY COMPUTED THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES 
SUSTAINED BY THE PLAINTIFF. 
It is the position of the Plaintiff that the damages sustained by him 
is the difference between the contract price of $3. 30 per bushel and the price 
on the date of the breach of $4.25 per bushel. This legal principle is contained 
in Section 70A-2-713, Utah Code Annotated, which provides as follows: 
"Buyer 's damages for nondelivery or repudiation. -
(1) Subject to the provisions of this chapter with 
respect to proof of market price (section 70A-2-
723), the measure of damages for nondelivery or 
repudiation by the sel ler i s the difference between 
the market price at the time when the buyer learned 
of the breach and the contract p r i c e . . . n [Emphasis 
added] 
The jury found in answer to Interrogatory #5 that the market pr ice of "as is11 
red wheat on August 15, 1973 was $4.25 per bushel which was based upon 
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considerable evidence from the Plaintiff and from the representative of 
Pillsbury Mills Company. 
The damages awarded were based upon the difference in the 
two prices of $.95 per bushel multiplied by the number of bushels called 
for in the contract, i . e . 15,000. However, the Defendant was given credit 
for the 1, 000 bushels which he had delivered in September of 1973 at the 
contract price of $3. 30 per bushel. This computation of damages was 
proper and in accordance with, the provisions of the Uniform Commercial 
Code set forth above. 
Some contention is made by the Defendant in his Brief that 
the damages assessed against him should be limited to the 12, 000 bushels 
of wheat which he actually produced from the farm in Cassia County, Idaho 
in 1973. This argument is made without any supporting authority and it 
would be totally inconsistent to allow the Defendant who had denied that a 
contract was entered into to change his position at this point to claim that 
the contract was to be of a different quantity or was to be an "amount 
produced11 contract. In Instruction #4 the Court advised the jury of the 
contention of the Plaintiff concerning the contract as follows: 
"The plaintiff alleges that on the second 
day of August, 1973, the parties entered 
into a contract wherein the defendant agreed 
to sell and the plaintiff agreed to buy 15, 000 
bushels of red wheat at $3.30 per b u s h e l , . . . " 
The jury found in answer to Interrogatories #1 and #2 that the contract as 
claimed by the Plaintiff was entered into between the par t ies . 
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POINT V 
THE MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT WAS 
PROPERLY DENIED. 
f 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has repeatedly ruled that * 
the law is in favor of the submission of disputed issues to the jury and of * 
i 
supporting their verdict when the same has been rendered. See Smith v. 
• 
Franklin, 14 Utah 2d 16, 376 P . 2d 541. It has also been held that it i s the . 
fundamental right of litigants to have their disputed issues submitted to the jury • 
i 
and that if the Courts were ready to override their jury verdicts when they 
i 
disagreed with them, the right of t r ia l by jury would be effectively denied. In • 
this regard, the Court in the case of Lund v. Phillips Pet. Co . , 10 Utah 2d 276, g 
351 P.2d 952, stated as follows: 
i 
"It is to serve the policy of safeguarding • 
the right of t r ia l by jury that in doubtful 
cases the doubts are resolved in favor of f 
submitting the case to the jury; and in favor < 
of supporting the verdict when rendered fl 
i 
In this case the part ies have had an opportunity to present their ( 
cases to the Court and the jury who answered a Special Verdict finding in favor 
i 
of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant on conflicting evidence and the Court 
declined to upset the verdict of the jury. In view of the foregoing, it seems ' 
that the following much quoted provision is applicable: 
11
 'Anyone acquainted with the practical opera-
tion cf a t r ia l by jury and the human factors 
that must play a part therein is aware that it 
would be almost impossible to complete a t r i a l 
of any length without some things occurring with 
which counsel, after the case is lost, can find 
fault and, in zeal for his cause, all quite in good 
faith, magnify into e r r o r which to him and the 
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losing parties seems blameable for their failure 
to prevail. However, from the standpoint of 
administering evenhanded justice the court must 
dispassionately survey such claims against the 
over-all picture of the tr ial , and if the parties 
have been afforded an opportunity to fully and 
fairly present their evidence and arguments upon 
the issues, and the jury has made its determina-
tion thereon, the objective of the proceeding has 
been accomplished. And the judgment should 
not be disturbed unless it is shown that there is 
e r r o r which is substantial and prejudicial in the 
sense that it appears that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the result would have been different 
in the absence of such e r r o r . . . . f Hales v. 
Peterson, 11 Utah 2d 411, 360 P. 2d 822" 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the testimony of the Defendant, there was ample 
justification for the finding by the jury that he had admitted "in his testimony 
or otherwise in court" that the contract as claimed by the Plaintiff for the 
sale of wheat was entered into. 
The jury found that an oral contract was entered into, that 
the Defendant was a "merchant" and that a written confirmation of the 
contract was received by Defendant from Plaintiff within a "reasonable time" 
thereafter as those te rms a re defined in the Uniform Commercial Code and 
there is no basis for upsetting its verdict. 
Additionally, the Court correctly computed the measure of 
damages as being the difference between the contract price of the commodity 
and its price as of the date of the breach. 
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Based upon the foregoing, the Judgment of the tr ial court should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. ANTHONY EYRE 
Kipp and Christian 
520 Boston Building « 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent 
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Mailed a copy of the foregoing Brief of Respondent to 
Omer J . Call, Attorney for Defendant/Appellant, 26 F i r s t Security Bank 
Building, Brigham City, Utah 84302, this 8th day of September, 1975. 
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